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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.

:

CaseNo.20010424-SC

CHARLES K. LEATHERBURY,

:

Priority No 13

Defendant/Petitioner.

:
INTRODUCTION

Petitioner/Defendant Charles Leatherbury ("Petitioner" or "Mr. Leatherbury")
relies on his opening brief, and replies to the state's brief as follows.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE STATE FAILED TO FILE A TIMELY NOTICE OF
APPEAL.
A. THE SIGNED MINUTE ENTRY WAS A FINAL APPEALABLE
ORDER.
After hearing argument on Mr. Leatherbury's motion to dismiss, the trial
judge granted that motion and outlined his reasons for dismissing the case:
. . . The problem is we've got an information, or at least a putative
information, pending in the prosecutor's office, their having accomplished
all of their required investigation, but we don't have it filed in the court.
So that in this particular case, on a kind of substantive equity level,
the concern that I've had in other cases about the prosecution being
subjected to an unreasonable burden is not present. Accordingly, I'm
going to construe what I perceive to be an ambiguity in favor of the
defendant, and I am granting the defendant's motion to dismiss.

R. 198.
Thereafter, the judge entered the minute entry, which states in part, "Court finds
in favor of defendant and orders the case dismissed. ATD to prepare findings of fact and
conclusions of law." R. 104-05 (emphasis added). Rather than simply including in the
record an unsigned minute entry documenting the hearing, the trial judge took the added
step of ordering the case dismissed and signing the minute entry. R. 105. The fact that
the judge made the effort to sign the minute entry, in which he ordered the case
dismissed, demonstrates that he contemplated that the minute entry was a final order.
Additionally, while the state insists that findings and conclusions were necessary
in order to understand the basis for the dismissal (state's brief at 11-12), a review of the
minute entry along with the court's statements at the conclusion of the hearing belies this
claim. As required by Utah R. Crim. P. 25(c), the reasons for the dismissal were
adequately addressed in the minute entry. Those reasons are the reasons outlined by the
defendant in support of his argument. Given that both parties knew that this issue was
relatively simple and hinged on whether the information was "pending" when
Mr. Leatherbury made his request for disposition, the court's minute entry adequately
outlined the basis for the dismissal; in other words, it was clear from the minute entry
that the judge found that the information was pending when Mr. Leatherbury filed his
request for disposition and the state failed to bring the case to trial within the required
time. Moreover, even if there were confusion as to the basis for the dismissal, which
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there should not have been in light of the argument and ruling, any arguable confusion
was more than cleared up by the trial judge's oral ruling.
While the trial court did contemplate that defense counsel would prepare findings
and conclusions, it did not contemplate further action which would affect the substance
of its ruling. Nor do the findings and conclusions add anything that had not already been
clearly resolved by the trial court. Indeed, the meat of the findings and conclusions is a
determination that the information was pending when Mr. Leatherbury made his request
for disposition.
In its brief, the state ignores Nielson v. Gurley, 888 P.2d 130, 132 (Utah App.
1994) which holds that a subsequent filing which does not affect the substantive rights of
the parties does "not create a new judgment for purposes of determining the timeliness of
appeal." Nielson, 888 P.2d at 132. Quoting this Court's opinion in Adamson v.
Brockbank, 185 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah 1947), the Court stated:
In Utah, the rule governing this issue is clear:
[W]here a belated entry merely constitutes an amendment or
modification not changing the substance or character of the
judgment, such entry is merely a nunc pro tunc entry which relates
back to the time the original judgment was entered, and does not
enlarge the time for appeal; but where the modification or
amendment is in some material matter, the time begins to run from
the time of the modification or amendment.
Nielsen, 888 P.2d at 132 (quoting Adamson, 185 P.2d at 268). Since the findings and
conclusions did not affect the substance or character of the dismissal, the entry of the
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findings and conclusions did not change the time for filing a notice of appeal.
A review of the cases relied on by the state for its claim that findings and
conclusions were necessary to understand the basis for the dismissal and finalize that
dismissal demonstrates that the state's reliance on those cases is misplaced. See state's
brief at 11-12. For example, Ahlstrom v. Anderson. 728 P. 2d 979 (Utah 1986) (per
curiam) (cited by the state on page 11) was an appeal from an unsigned minute entry.
This Court held that M[a]n unsigned minute entry is not a final, appealable order." IcL_
While this Court went on to say that it could not "consider an appeal in the absence of a
final order, signed by the court and supported, when appropriate, by findings of fact and
conclusions of law," the reference to findings and conclusions is dictum and had no
bearing on the decision since the case involved an unsigned minute entry rather than the
absence of findings. Moreover, the case to which the Court cited in support of this
dictum likewise involved an appeal from an unsigned minute entry and did not address
the issue of whether entry of findings following entry of an order dismissing a criminal
case changed the time for filing a notice of appeal. See id. (citing Wilson v. Manning,
645 P.2d 655 (Utah 1982)).
Salt Lake City v. Hanson, 425 P.2d 773, 775 (Utah 1967), cited by the state on
page 11 of its brief, likewise does not support the state's claim that a dismissal in a
criminal case is not a final appealable order unless the reasons for the dismissal are stated
in the order. In Hanson, this Court recognized that there are sound reasons for requiring
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a trial judge who dismisses a case to state the reasons for the dismissal in the order. Id.
This Court did not hold, however, that failure to state the reasons deprived an order of
dismissal of its finality for purposes of appealing that order. In fact, in Hanson, the Court
reviewed the merits of the order of dismissal and held that the trial court had improperly
dismissed the case. IcL Rather than supporting the state's claim that the order of
dismissal was not a final appealable order because it did not outline the reasons for the
dismissal, Hanson actually supports the notion that an order of dismissal is a final
appealable order regardless of whether the reasons for the dismissal are stated in the
order. Id. Just as this Court was able to review the dismissal order in Hanson even
though the order did not include the reasons for the dismissal, it is likewise able to
review the dismissal order in this case where the basis for the dismissal is more than
evident from the record.
Nor does Swenson Associates Architects v. State, 889 P.2d 415, 417 (Utah 1994),
stand for the proposition asserted by the state "that where a signed minute entry expressly
or impliedly contemplates the entry of a subsequent document, it is not a final appealable
order." State's brief at 10. In Swenson, the signed minute entry explicitly stated that
counsel for the defendants was to prepare an " Order showing that the Motions are
denied." IdL at 417. The language of the minute entry in Swenson clearly demonstrated
that the signed minute entry was not intended as a final order because the signed minute
entry stated that an order was to be prepared. Id. at 417. Swenson does not say that the

5

express or implied contemplation of filing any subsequent document requires the
conclusion that a signed minute entry is not a final appealable order, and instead says that
where the signed minute entry expressly states that a further order regarding the motion
at issue is to be filed, the signed minute entry is not a final appealable order.
The state's assertions that "[t]he language of the minute entry in this case is on par
with that in Hartford [Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Clegg. 135 P.2d 919 (Utah 1943)]" is
also incorrect. See state's brief at 10. In Hartford, the court entered a minute entry in a
civil case which stated, "[t]he within entitled matter having been by the court, taken under
advisement, the court now renders its decision that judgment be entered against the
plaintiff and in favor of the defendant." Id_ at 921. There is no indication that the minute
entry was signed. Id In addition, the minute entry did not state that the court ordered
that judgment be entered in favor of the defendant and instead merely recorded the
ruling. Id. Moreover, there was no provision for awarding costs, a further indication in
a civil case that the minute entry was not a final judgment. Id. at 922. The plaintiff
moved to amend the complaint after this minute entry was entered, and the judge granted
that motion over defendant's objections. Id. at 921. In concluding that the minute entry
was not a final appealable order, the Supreme Court stated:
. . . the minute order was not a final judgment. It did not purport to finally
adjudicate the rights of the parties. It was neither a judgment of dismissal
nor a judgment on the merits for the defendant. No provision was made for
awarding of costs and it is obvious that something more was contemplated
by the court. It was not supported by findings of fact and conclusions of
law as we have consistently held that it must be to constitute a final
6

judgment. Wavland v. Woollev. 61 Utah 287, 213 P. 200; Emerson Brantineham Imp. Co. v. Stringfellow, 57 Utah 284, 194 P. 340.
Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 135 P.2d at 922. In other words, it was clear from
the order the case was not yet concluded and that the judge would render further
decisions which at least included the awarding of costs.
By contrast, the present case is a criminal case which was dismissed. While
awarding costs is part of a civil case, it plays no role in a criminal case. All claims had
been disposed of; further action which affected the substantial rights of the parties did
not remain. In fact, Mr. Leatherbury was released on this case at the time the minute
entry was signed. R. 199. While it was evident in Hartford that the minute entry was not
final because costs had not been awarded, the parties contemplated further action
affecting the substance of the lawsuit, and the minute entry apparently was not signed, in
the present case, the judge signed the minute entry, no further decision by the court was
contemplated, and Mr. Leatherbury was released.
Although Hartford suggests in dictum that findings and conclusions are required
for a judgment to be final, Hartford and the cases to which it refers are all civil cases
where findings play a different role than they do in the dismissal of a criminal action, and
a delay while findings are being prepared does not affect the custody or probationary
status of the defendant. In fact, the findings and conclusions referred to in Hartford and
the two cases it cites for this proposition included not only findings, but also the
judgment. In other words, the statement, n[t]here is no decision of the court until
7

findings of fact and conclusions of law are signed by the judge and filed with the court"
(Wayland, 213 P. at 201), referred to the entry judgment as well as the findings, and was
a restatement of the accepted rule that a final appealable order or judgment does not exist
until the document is signed and filed with the court. See Emerson-Brantingham Imp.
Co. v. Stringfellow, 194 P. 340, 340 (Utah 1920); Wayland. 213 P. at 201.
Wayland, Emerson-Brantingham Imp. Co., and Hartford did not address the issue
in this case as to whether a signed minute entry in a criminal case was a final appealable
order where findings of fact and conclusions of law had not been filed. Hartford merely
referred to the language in Wayland and Emerson-Brantingham as additional support for
its conclusion that the minute entry was not final. Indeed, there was no dispute in
Hartford regarding the entry of findings, and the issue instead involved whether a minute
entry which was unsigned and necessarily contemplated further decision by the court was
a final order.
Wayland also did not involve an issue of whether a judgment that had been signed
and entered was final where findings and conclusions had not yet been entered. In
Wayland, the judge had orally pronounced sentence but had not entered a signed
judgment. Wayland, 213 P. at 200. In fact, the findings and conclusions document
referred to in the opinion was actually a document which included "findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and judgment." IJL at 200. The point of the quoted language in
Wayland was simply that a judgment which has been orally pronounced does not become
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final until it is signed and entered. IdL at 201. Wavland therefore did not address the
issue or hold that a judgment which has been signed and entered is not final if findings
have not yet been prepared.
Emerson-Brantingham Imp. Co. likewise referred to a single document which
included findings, conclusions and judgment. 194 P. at 340. The language indicating
that a final decision has not been rendered until the findings and conclusions have been
filed refers to the judgment as well and simply reiterates the accepted rule that a
judgment or order is not final until it is signed and entered. IcL at 341.
The state also relies on Justice Zimmerman's concurring opinion in Automated
Control Products Corp. v. Tel-Tech Inc.. 780 P.2d 1258, 1264 (Utah 1989) (Zimmerman,
J., concurring), for the proposition that findings are important to the judicial function and
designed to '"flesh out the rationale for the decision.'" State's brief at 13 (citing id.
(Zimmerman, J., concurring) at 13). The state neglects to acknowledge, however, that
Justice Zimmerman drew a distinction between judge drafted and counsel drafted
findings, indicating that counsel drafted findings, which may "inject findings that may
not be entirely in conformity with the judge's view," (id. at 1264) have little importance
and play less of a role in the judicial function. The counsel drafted findings in this case,
while addressing a number of factors, add nothing to the trial court's prior conclusion
that the case was to be dismissed because a pending information existed when
Mr. Leatherbury made his request for disposition, and the state thereafter failed to bring
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him to trial within 120 days. Because they did not change the substance of the dismissal
order contained in the signed minute entry, the entry of findings and conclusions did not
change the time for filing a notice of appeal.
Despite the state's efforts to distinguish Cannon v. Keller. 692 P.2d 740, 741, n. 1
(Utah 1984) (see state's brief at 12, n. 2), that case provides further support for the
determination that the signed minute entry dismissing this case was a final appealable
order. While the memorandum decision from which the appeal was taken outlined the
district court's rationale in granting an extraordinary writ, it did not contain findings. IcL
at 742. Nevertheless, it was a final appealable order. More importantly, this Court's
decision that an appeal could be taken from the memorandum decision was based on the
fact that the ruling clearly specified "a final determination of the rights of the parties and
[was] capable of enforcement," (IcL at 741, n. 1) and was not based on the information
relating to the court's reasoning which was contained in the memorandum decision. In
other words, this Court concluded that the memorandum decision in Cannon was a final
appealable order because it was clear as to the rights of the parties and could be enforced.
The minute entry dismissing this case is likewise clear as to the rights of the parties and
capable of enforcement, making it a final appealable order pursuant to Cannon .
Utah case law, including, among others, Hanson, Nielsen, and Cannon, requires
the conclusion that the signed minute entry in this case was a final appealable order
because it finally adjudicated the rights of the parties, was capable of enforcement, and
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was not changed in substance or character by the entry offindingsand conclusions. The
state's failure to file a notice of appeal within thirty days of the entry of that signed
minute entry require that this appeal be dismissed.
B. EVEN IF THE SIGNED MINUTE ENTRY WAS NOT A FINAL
APPEALABLE ORDER, ENTRY OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
FINALLY ADJUDICATED THE RIGHTS OF THE PARTIES AND
DISMISSED THE CASE.
The state claims that the dismissal was not final until the entry of the second order
of dismissal because the signed minute entry and findings and conclusions, when
considered together, did not meet the requirements of Utah R. Crim. P. 25 that the reason
for the dismissal "be set forth in an order and entered in the minutes." State's brief at 1316. The state's argument fails because it (1) disregards the fact that this Court has
considered an order of dismissal final for purpose of appeal where the order does not
includefindings;(2) ignores the fact that thefindingsand conclusions refer to,
incorporate and restate the dismissal ordered in the signed minute entry; and (3)
disregards the obvious inference that the reason defense counsel did not file an order of
dismissal was that he believed the case had been dismissed.
First, as set forth previously, this Court considered an order of dismissal a final
appealable order in Hanson even though the order did not state the reasons for the
dismissal. Hanson, 425 P.2d at 775. While the Court recognized that there are important
reasons for stating the basis for the dismissal, it did not hold that a statement of the
reasons was necessary for the order of dismissal to be considered final. The state's
11

argument that the dismissal was not final until the second order of dismissal was entered
because an order and the reasons therefore are required disregards Hanson .
Second, the state's argument that the second order of dismissal was necessary to
finally dismiss this case disregards the fact that even if the reasons for the dismissal must
be outlined to have a final order, the findings of fact and conclusions of law, read
together with the signed minute entry, met any such requirement. The findings and
conclusions refer to the order of dismissal and implicitly incorporate it. Moreover, the
findings and conclusions reiterate that the case was dismissed and that Mr. Leatherbury
was entitled to that dismissal. Read together, the findings and conclusions and signed
minute entry meet the requirements of Utah R. Crim. P. 25(c) and establish a final order
of dismissal no later than the entry of the findings.
Third, the state's argument ignores the obvious inference in this case that
defense counsel believed that the case was dismissed and an additional order of dismissal
was unnecessary. The state recognizes that defense counsel had the "greatest interest in
ensuring that the decision in his favor was properly and timely entered." State's brief at
14. Defense counsel pursued this interest by making sure that his client was released on
these charges on the day of the hearing (R. 198-99), obtaining a signed minute entry
dismissing the case, and submitting findings and conclusions as ordered by the judge
within a reasonable amount of time following the dismissal. While the state suggests that
the prosecutor was waiting patiently for defense counsel to submit an order of dismissal
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and finally gave up and submitted his own, a much more likely scenario is that the
prosecutor simply missed the date for filing the notice of appeal and submitted the
second, superfluous order of dismissal with the hope that it would resurrect the state's
ability to appeal the dismissal in this case.
In this case, where the minute entry ordered the case dismissed, was signed by the
judge, and served to release Mr. Leatherbury on these charges, an additional order of
dismissal, signed and entered after the findings and conclusions were entered, was
superfluous. The state missed the time for filing a notice of appeal in this case. The
Court of Appeals incorrectly concluded that the state's attempt to resurrect its appeal by
submitting a second order of dismissal triggered the 30 days for filing a notice of appeal.
Mr. Leatherbury respectfully requests that the decision of the Court of Appeals be
overturned and the state's appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
POINT II. AN INFORMATION WHICH WAS PREPARED AND
SIGNED BY THE PROSECUTOR AFTER MR. LEATHERBURY WAS
ARRESTED AND BOOKED ON THE CHARGES WAS A PENDING
INFORMATION UNDER THE STATUTE.
Because this issue involves a matter of statutory construction, the language of
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (1999) controls the determination of whether the trial judge
correctly dismissed this case when it was not brought to trial within 120 days of
Mr. Leatherbury's request for disposition. Decisions by courts in other states with
speedy trial statutes containing different language provide little guidance in assessing
whether the information which had been prepared in this case was "pending" under
13

Utah's statute. The state's reliance on four cases from two states in support of its claim
that pursuant to Utah's statute the information was not pending is therefore misplaced.
See state's brief at 21-22.
The state's reliance on two Florida cases for the proposition that a request for
disposition made prior to the filing of an information is a nullity (state's brief at 21-22)
provides no guidance because the language of Florida's speedy trial rule requires that a
person be charged with a crime by indictment or information before the request is filed.
See State ex rel. Hanks. 253 So.2d 129, 130 (Fla. 1971). Moreover, Florida's rule also
"requires that trial be commenced within 180 days from the date the defendant is taken
into custody." Id. at 130-31. Because Florida's rule does not refer to a "pending"
information, the decisions cited by the state do not aid in resolving the issue of whether .
an information which has been prepared and signed by the prosecutor but not filed with
the court is a pending information under Utah's statute.
The state's reliance on two Colorado cases for the proposition that an information
must be filed with the court in order to be pending is likewise not compelling. See
state's brief at 21-2. In People v. Calhoon. 897 P.2d 855, 856-57 (Colo. 1995), the
parties agreed that a charge was not pending against the defendant when he made his
request for disposition. The issue of whether an information must be filed in order to be
pending was therefore not directly decided by the court. Although the parties agreed that
a pending charge did not exist when the defendant made his request, the court
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nevertheless indicated that under Colorado's speedy trial statute, n[t]he existence of an
untried indictment, information, or criminal complaint is necessary before a prisoner may
invoke the [statute's] procedural protection." IcL at 857. The court went on to equate the
existence of a charge in a criminal case with the filing of an information. See id. The
other Colorado case relied upon by the state is inapposite since it is a civil case which
holds that a court is without jurisdiction to appoint a receiver when a civil complaint has
not been filed. See state's brief at 21, relying on Johnson v. McCaughan, Carter &
Sharrer, 672 P.2d 221, 222 (Colo. App. 1983). The fact that a civil case commences
when a complaint is filed does not address the issue of whether an information is pending
in a criminal case under the circumstances of this case.
The state contends that if this Court were to hold that the information which had
been prepared and signed by the prosecutor was "pending" under section 77-29-1, the
statute would act as a statute of limitations, regardless of whether the crime had been
discovered. State's brief at 23. The state's concerns are far too sweeping in this case
where the crime had been identified, Mr. Leatherbury had been arrested on the charge,
and an information had been prepared. In the context of the constitutional right to a
speedy trial, either the arrest and continued custody of the defendant or the filing of an
information or indictment triggers the time for calculating whether the right was violated.
See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971); see also State v. Fevos. 617 P.2d 490,
491 (Alaska 1980) (speedy trial right under Alaska's former rule commenced on date of
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arrest). In cases where the defendant has been arrested, and the state has identified the
charge and taken the further step of booking the defendant, any concern that the crime
might not have been discovered does not exist. In this case, Mr. Leatherbury was
arrested and booked on the charges (R. 22). The prosecutor had prepared and signed the
information before Mr. Leatherbury made his request for disposition. Under these
circumstances, holding that the information was pending when Mr. Leatherbury made his
request for disposition does not create an unfair limit on the state's ability to prosecute.
While time served for a parole violation does not count in the Sixth Amendment
speedy trial analysis (see State v. Smith, 699 P.2d 711,713 (Utah 1985))1, an arrest on
new charges is nevertheless pertinent since it clarifies that the state has identified the new
charges. The Sixth Amendment cases which run the time either from the date of arrest
followed by continued custody, or from the filing of an information, clarify that running
the time from arrest does not present the practical problems suggested by the state.
In this case, there was a pending information when Mr. Leatherbury made his
request for disposition. That information had been prepared and signed by the
prosecutor. Since the Mr. Laetherbury was not brought to trial within 120 days of his

1

While Smith held that the Sixth Amendment speedy trial right did not attach at
the time of the defendant's reincarceration because he was imprisoned on a parole
violation rather than the new charge, Smith did not answer the question of whether the
statutory speedy trial right is triggered by a request for disposition which is made after an
information has been prepared and signed but before it is filed in the court. See Smith,
699P.2dat713.
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request, the trial court correctly dismissed the case. The Court of Appeals therefore erred
in concluding that the information must be filed in order to be pending. Mr. Leatherbury
respectfully requests that the Court of Appeals decision be overturned and the charges
dismissed.
CONCLUSION
Petitioner/Defendant Charles Leatherbury respectfully requests that this Court
order that the state's appeal be dismissed based on a failure to file a timely notice of
appeal. In the event this Court concludes that the appeal was timely, Petitioner
respectfully requests that this Court reverse the ruling of the Court of Appeals and affirm
the trial court's order of dismissal.
DATED this (&

day of April, 2002.

JOAN C. WATT
Attorney for Defendant/Petitioner

DANIEL M. TORRENCE
Attorney for Defendant/Petitioner
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